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THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND COVID-19: PRIVACY 
VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST
Mónica Correia1, Guilhermina Rego2, Rui Nunes3
Abstract: Recent studies highlight the importance of digital surveillance to gather individual health information due to the global 
pandemic caused by the new COVID-19 disease. This paper analyses its legal and ethical implications at the interface between 
the individual right to privacy and the collective interests of public health. We framed the discussion in law, deontology and 
utilitarianism. The lasted theories and human rights, especially privacy, are crucial in our argument. Health-derived dilemmas 
and efforts to solve them, especially by information technologies, bioethics and law, exist at these perspectives’ interface. In 
particular, we analysed the intersection between autonomy, the right to privacy, and the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ in the 
public health context. In other words, we studied the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of health data – a radical 
means of control over personal data established in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Given the 
lack of specifics regarding collection and re-use of such data under the broad scope of public health purposes, implied consent 
does not address the issue of proportionality. We highlight legal safeguards’ insufficiency, suggesting applying the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ according to an ethical interpretation.
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El derecho al olvido y el COVID-19: privacidad frente a interés público
Resumen: Estudios recientes destacan la importancia de la vigilancia digital para recoger información sanitaria individual debido 
a la pandemia mundial causada por la nueva enfermedad COVID-19. Este artículo analiza sus implicaciones legales y éticas 
en la interfaz entre el derecho individual a la privacidad y los intereses colectivos de la salud pública. Enmarcamos la discusión 
en el derecho, la deontología y el utilitarismo. Estas últimas teorías y los derechos humanos, especialmente la privacidad, son 
cruciales en nuestro argumento. Los dilemas relacionados con la salud y los esfuerzos por resolverlos, especialmente a través 
de la tecnología de la información, la bioética y el derecho, se encuentran en la interfaz de estas perspectivas. En particular, 
analizamos la intersección entre la autonomía, el derecho a la privacidad y el llamado “derecho al olvido” en el contexto de la 
salud pública. Es decir, estudiamos el derecho a obtener del responsable del tratamiento la supresión de los datos de salud, un 
medio radical de control sobre los datos personales establecido en el artículo 17 del Reglamento general de protección de datos 
(RGPD).  Dada la falta de especificidades en cuanto a la recogida y reutilización de dichos datos dentro del amplio ámbito de los 
objetivos de salud pública, el consentimiento implícito no aborda la cuestión de la proporcionalidad. Destacamos la insuficiencia 
de las garantías legales, sugiriendo la aplicación del “derecho al olvido” según una interpretación ética.
Palabras clave: COVID-19, ética, privacidad, salud pública, ‘derecho al olvido’
O Direito ao Esquecimento e COVID-19: Privacidade versus Interesse Público
Resumo: Estudos recentes salientam a importância da vigilância digital para recolher informações individuais de saúde devido à 
pandemia global causada pela nova doença COVID-19. Este artigo analisa as suas implicações legais e éticas na interface entre o 
direito individual à privacidade e os interesses coletivos da saúde pública. Enquadramos a discussão no direito, na deontologia 
e no utilitarismo. As últimas teorias e os direitos humanos, especialmente a privacidade, são cruciais na nossa argumentação. 
Dilemas derivados da saúde e esforços para os resolver, especialmente através das tecnologias da informação, da bioética e do 
direito, existem na interface destas perspetivas. Em particular, analisámos a intersecção entre autonomia, direito à privacidade, 
e o chamado “direito ao esquecimento” no contexto da saúde pública. Por outras palavras, estudámos o direito de obter do 
responsável pelo tratamento o apagamento dos dados de saúde, um meio radical de controlo dos dados pessoais estabelecido 
no artigo 17º do Regulamento Geral de Proteção de Dados (RGPD). Dada a falta de especificidades em relação à recolha e 
reutilização de tais dados no âmbito alargado dos objetivos de saúde pública, o consentimento implícito não aborda a questão 
da proporcionalidade. Destacamos a insuficiência de salvaguardas jurídicas, sugerindo a aplicação do “direito ao esquecimento” 
de acordo com uma interpretação ética.
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lance is in the plan of COVID-19 battle(7). In 
other countries, the creation of biobanks of in-
fected patients without proper consent and due 
process is also at stake.
Faced with these examples, that predictably can 
replicate on a planetary scale, the question for re-
flection is legal and ethical. It is necessary to think 
through the extent to which the public health 
measures adopted will not lengthen beyond what 
is required, exposing some fundamental rights, es-
pecially autonomy and the right to privacy (most-
ly in its informational dimension). Taking the case 
of the coronavirus outbreak, paradigmatic, and 
in progress, our aim in this article is to analyse 
its legal and ethical implications at the interface 
between the individual right to privacy and the 
collective interests of public health.
To fulfil our goal, we based our reflection on legal 
and bioethical theoretical research. We framed the 
discussion in law, deontology and utilitarianism. 
The lasted theories and human rights, especially 
privacy, are crucial in our argument. Health-de-
rived dilemmas and efforts to solve them, especial-
ly by information technologies, bioethics and law, 
exist at these perspectives’ interface. Furthermore, 
we analysed the intersection between autonomy, 
the right to privacy, and the so-called ‘right to be 
forgotten’ in the public health context. In other 
words, regarding personal health data, we studied 
the right to obtain from the controller its erasure 
– a radical means of control over personal data by 
its holder established in Article 17 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)(8). Given 
the lack of specifics regarding collection and re-
use of such data under the broad scope of public 
health purposes, implied consent does not address 
the issue of proportionality in the sense that an ac-
tion shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve 
its objectives. We highlight legal safeguards’ insuf-
ficiency, suggesting applying the ‘right to be for-
gotten’ according to an ethical interpretation.
Covid-19: from Utilitarianism to Human 
Rights
There are two essential and distinct(9) (although 
not exclusive) philosophical perspectives regard-
ing moral judgment: deontological ethics and 
consequentialist ethics(10). These ideas rely on 
Introduction
Recently, the media and the scientific community 
produced a considerable amount of information 
about the global pandemic caused by the new 
COVID-19 disease. Public pressure forced gov-
ernments across the globe to take public health 
measures to contain the pandemic. Regardless of 
the greater or lesser degree of restrictions, in most 
countries, there is a tendency towards confine-
ment measures, a new reality for the collective 
good. Analysts from several backgrounds predict 
long lasting consequences for the financial mar-
kets, the economy, and even the political regimes 
in place, namely difficulties for liberal democra-
cies are foreseen(1) with a potential rise in au-
thoritarianism(2). Although some positions claim 
that there is a suspension of democratic values and 
rights, others argue that democracy will only get 
stronger by everyone’s responsibility to prevent 
contamination(3). Indeed, decision-makers argue 
that quarantine measures are exceptional. Accord-
ing to Rajczi(4): “Liberalism permits some state 
intervention to prevent one person from harming 
another (…) quarantine measures prevent wrong-
ful harm to third parties.” On the other hand, 
there is a growing development of digital tools to 
identify infected people and their possible chains 
of contamination(5). 
Faced with doubt, people tend to trust more in all 
measures, but these should be proportionate to the 
desired effect(3), and so, reduced in purpose and 
time. However, the public discourse in democratic 
countries does not address sufficiently the respect 
for individual fundamental rights, a civilizational 
achievement that our ancestors managed to estab-
lish and consolidate over decades, i.e. a core mini-
mum of ethical values that define the essence of 
human dignity itself. Indeed, recent information 
points to the generalization of digital surveillance 
occurring in China and other countries(5). Pri-
vacy there is questionable. In this sense, a jour-
nalistic report of a reputable English newspaper 
explains that the monitoring of Chinese citizens’ 
behaviour is constant and growing exponentially 
and refers to the difficulty of stopping this trend 
under the pretext of fighting the pandemic and 
preventing the future of public health(6). In Eu-
rope, despite stated concerns about privacy in the 
so-called “contact tracing” digital tools, surveil-
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ertheless, one could argue that freedom is in dan-
ger if human beings have no privacy(14). In this 
perspective, privacy is a condition of autonomy. 
Given that the Kantian ethics(12) is formal and 
centred on the autonomy of the will, it bears em-
phasizing that Kant’s categorical imperative is the 
only valid criterion that we must follow to decide 
whether an act is morally permissible(15-17). 
Accordingly, in the aftermath of COVID-19 we 
should enhance privacy and data protection. Data 
subjects might have the right to request the eras-
ure of COVID-19 identifying data provided these 
data are no longer necessary given the purpose for 
which they were collected or processed. The ‘right 
to be forgotten’ may make sense in the future for 
some data, as they allow moral judgments and 
might have social stigma effects. Bioethics, the law 
and information technology have a leading role in 
this setting to prevent privacy violations.
With these remarks behind us, let us turn to some 
anti-stigma arguments, which can also relate to 
deontology theory. 
Some could argue that disease-associated stigma 
is something outdated, that it belongs to the past, 
such as leprosy(18). However, recent facts proved 
this idea mistaken. Violent avoidance behaviour 
towards coronavirus infected people occurred just 
recently in Spain. According to a Spanish newspa-
per(19), a group of residents who gathered at the 
entrances of a city threw stones to an ambulance 
caravan transporting twenty-eight older adults in-
fected with the coronavirus. The National Police 
had to escort them. Also, people gathered in the 
outskirts of the city and threatened to take action 
if more sick people arrived. During the night, the 
locals threw several explosive devices from build-
ings near the residence where the infected seniors 
remained.
This example sets the need to supplement new 
information technologies and regulation regard-
ing data protection, which should bolster the fun-
damental right to privacy, autonomy and inhibit 
stigmatization related to the disease. Indeed, re-
cent literature emphasizes stigmatization associ-
ated with diseases(20-25). Social stigma regarding 
disease (having or not having Covid-19, for in-
stance) can have severe consequences in several di-
“foundational principles”(11) that might have dif-
ferent implications in privacy rights. 
Deontological ethics (from Greek, dei, “must”) 
refers to the moral theory according to which the 
rightness or wrongness of an action depends on 
features of the act itself, not on its consequences. 
It is ethics centred on the notion of duty (9) set 
up, for instance, in Immanuel Kant’s philoso-
phy(12). This philosopher considered that only 
goodwill is good in itself; goodwill is a will that 
acts out of duty. According to the Kantian per-
spective, what determines the morality of the ac-
tion is not the objective, but the will that causes it. 
The will or practical reason acts according to the 
imperatives of necessary actions, which translates 
into the following precept: “act only according to 
such a maxim that you can at the same time want 
it to become a universal law”(12).
This philosophical principle is, of course, abstract. 
However, suppose we relate it to the value of pri-
vacy at the present public health context. In this 
case, one could argue that information technology 
and the law, for example, is critical, as it comprises 
the necessary actions or processes to accomplish 
public health protection without jeopardizing 
privacy. In this sense, the proper use of informa-
tion technology and law suggest both can protect 
privacy. On the contrary, its mistreatment might 
have the opposite effect. As so, information tech-
nology and fair law use allow a perspective shift 
from “threat” to “solution”.
Furthermore, Kant was one of the pioneers to ac-
knowledge man as an end in itself(13). Dignity 
is the value of everything that is priceless, i.e., an 
equivalent cannot replace it. Dignity is a qual-
ity inherent to human beings to the extent that 
they autonomously exercise their practical reason; 
in this sense, human beings build distinct hu-
man personalities, each individual and irreplace-
able(13). One shall treat human beings as an end 
in themselves because of rational human nature. 
Humanity is dignity(13), thus inseparable from 
autonomy. In this sense, one could argue that 
autonomy is the foundation of privacy as a fun-
damental right. Autonomy in the sense of self-
determination (freedom of choice), or Kantian’s 
exercise of practical reason, entails freedom. Nev-
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dom that people will want to return to once the 
pandemic has reached its peak, suggesting that 
individuals may gladly choose a bio-surveillance 
society to protect their health better(1). This is a 
utilitarian argument. 
The nonconforming voices of this theory consider 
that it constitutes a threat because it might not 
safeguard individual rights; it might manipulate 
people and endanger human dignity. We would 
argue this might be the case as regards privacy and 
data protection.
In medical ethics, we can summarize these two 
theories as follows: deontology is patient-focused 
while utilitarianism is population-focused(31). 
Deontology emphasizes individual rights, while 
utilitarianism highlights collective rights. The dif-
ference between these two perspectives derives 
mostly from the idea that liberalism is incompat-
ible with proper protection of the common good. 
However, some criticize this argument. It is one 
of the most contested and discussed points in po-
litical philosophy, e.g. in the work of Rawls(32). 
Utilitarianism is concerned with the individual 
happiness and well-being no less than with ‘collec-
tive good’. John Stuart Mill(29) laid down parts 
of the foundational theoretical groundwork for 
human rights as well. Furthermore, if we consider 
Kantian take on duties, one could claim that an 
individual also bears a moral duty to inform oth-
ers about his/her diagnosis to prevent harm to 
them, i.e. to treat others as ‘ends in themselves’, 
not as means to one’s well-being. This perspective 
calls for the ethics of virtue and a more expanded 
concept of free will(28).
Now let us turn to a brief remark on both theories 
through the lens of human rights.
The right to privacy, as a fundamental human 
right, has its foundation in the dignity of every 
human being, so it is a universal right, that is, val-
id for all people(33). Human rights fulfilment is a 
material expression of a deontological approach, 
but this is not absolute. Indeed, there are strong 
utilitarian arguments in favour of strong data pro-
tection, based on the necessity to prevent privacy 
harms, including threats to autonomy and dignity. 
Having in mind that health data is mainly sensi-
tive and that fundamental rights are not absolute, 
mensions: mental health, family life, access to em-
ployment and others, such as bank loan, health, 
and life insurance. As Oaten, Stevenson(26) state: 
“The study of stigma is important because of its 
adverse consequences for personal and social well-
being. Stigmatized groups suffer inequalities in 
employment, education, and health settings, as 
well as adverse health outcomes and difficulties in 
forming interpersonal relationships.” Therefore, 
we argue that the entities responsible in this mat-
ter should improve privacy, especially regarding 
COVID-19 track-and-trace apps. 
 Given that autonomy depends on freedom ac-
cording to Kant’s perspective, the latest is essential 
to avoid stigma. Privacy is, thus, vital to ensure 
freedom(14). Health privacy is even more press-
ing as it deals with the most profound intimacy 
of the human being. Hence, only in extraordinary 
situations, privacy might be pushed into the back-
ground, namely when demanding public health 
problems are at stake, such as in a pandemic 
(COVID-19 for example). Notwithstanding, once 
the extraordinary or exceptional situation is over, 
privacy must assume its fullness so that autonomy 
and freedom can once again guarantee human 
dignity as an ethical value par excellence(27).
On the other hand, consequentialist ethics is the 
moral theory, according to which one can consid-
er actions right or wrong because of their conse-
quences(10,28). Utilitarianism is the best-known 
form of consequentialism(9,28). In utilitarianism, 
defended by John Stuart Mill(29) and Jeremy 
Bentham(30), the right action is to maximize the 
good and utility. The good is, in general, pleas-
ure. Thus, utilitarianism is the ethics of normal 
happiness. Actions are right if they tend to pro-
mote the greatest global happiness and wrong if 
not. Individual sacrifice is useless if it does not 
increase the total amount of happiness. Indeed, 
the claims of individuals lose importance for the 
benefit of all(29,30). Regarding privacy, utilitari-
anism might constitute a challenge, because one 
might consider less privacy as a necessary means 
to justify the collective good. In a severe utilitarian 
perspective, one might judge disclosing personal 
data without proper consent right according to a 
recognized utility for public health, for instance. 
Indeed, regarding the coronavirus outbreak, some 
argue that there is no answer to the degree of free-
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fair balance to avoid a radical utilitarian perspec-
tive. The question is precisely in knowing when 
the collective or public interest should overcome 
individual rights. It is then a question of knowing 
when the right to health privacy should become 
seconded, taking into account the interest of so-
ciety. To know when it is more relevant to reveal 
health information than to keep it under reserva-
tion. For example, a reason for the public interest 
that will imply the dissemination of health results, 
even though it may conflict with privacy, occurs 
when it comes to transmittable diseases, such as 
COVID-19. In this case, state authorities around 
the globe have implemented countless security 
measures to contain the coronavirus outbreak(35). 
Notwithstanding, in some cases, these measures 
bump into individual rights and liberties. Moreo-
ver, in a recent viewpoint about US Emergency 
Legal Responses to Novel Coronavirus, it is point-
ed out: “During crises, the government has a spe-
cial responsibility to thoughtfully balance public 
health protections and civil liberties(36). 
Therefore, we argue it is crucial that following this 
COVID-19 pandemic, the measures that several 
countries took concerning the collection of per-
sonal data of infected citizens do not extend. This 
matter requires adequate regulation. As we are 
about to discuss, we should re-examine the GDPR 
considering this new threat to personal data pro-
tection, particularly regarding special categories of 
data such as those regarding health. Indeed, in the 
European Union, public health is a specific excep-
tion when it comes to the processing of personal 
data and especially to the so-called, ‘right to be 
forgotten’ established in Article 17º of the GDPR 
(European Union 2016). This right grants its 
holder to obtain from the controller having his/
her data deleted provided the data are no longer 
necessary given the purpose for which they were 
collected or processed. Article 17 of the GDPR(8) 
specifies that the ‘right to be forgotten’ does not 
apply to special categories of data - as is the case 
with health data - if the processing is necessary for 
public health purposes in the public interest, for 
example, protection against serious cross-border 
threats to health. It is the case of the coronavirus 
pandemic.
Nevertheless, as regards the exception of public 
health, we would argue that a necessary causal link 
we believe that bioethics, the law and information 
technologies should play an essential role in deliv-
ering balanced solutions, which would meet half-
way between deontology and utilitarianism.   
Our point in laying down in this discussion ba-
sic philosophical concepts such as deontology and 
utilitarianism is that it might help us to think 
about current data collection practices in response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the risks that 
may result from the use of digital technologies 
concerning health data privacy in this context. 
It might help us bridge the topic to what we are 
about to discuss, i.e. the validity (or not) of the 
right to be forgotten (RTBF) in the public health 
context, and whether it is necessary to look be-
yond this law to bioethical principles to help us 
through the challenge as to how we should under-
stand the RTBF.
Privacy, Autonomy, the Right to Be Forgotten 
and the Public Good
According to Reich(34), privacy in health can 
encompass: “Decisional privacy: refers to the free-
dom of procedural interference, i.e., the exclusion 
of third parties from the decision-making process 
(…); information privacy: achieved by imposing 
limits on unauthorized access to personal infor-
mation and data of an individual nature, for ex-
ample, HIV test results or genetic data.” The right 
to privacy in health and the principle of autonomy 
relate closely to these concepts. This relationship 
is so proximate that one might argue that without 
privacy, there is a challenge for self-determination 
in general and informational self-determination, 
in particular. 
However, it is also essential to address the question 
of the balance between public interest and privacy, 
the latter as a manifestation of autonomy. Indeed, 
as Rajczi(4) points out: “Many public health di-
lemmas involve a tension between the promotion 
of health and the rights of individuals.”
In democratic and plural societies, the common 
good requires the contribution of each individual 
to that end, which may imply some individual 
sacrifice for the benefit of the collective interest. 
In the area of  health, one must interpret this idea 
with caution, meaning that this sacrifice needs a 
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between the need to depreciate the fundamental 
right to data protection and the value of public 
health is necessary to establish. In other words: it 
does not seem acceptable that any health data can 
fall within the scope of the exception to Article 17 
of the GDPR without establishing a concrete cau-
sality between that data and public health. There-
fore, health data must be of “actual” public health 
relevance and not merely of a “potential” one. In-
deed, the reverse view would make this exception 
a rule. Thus, we argue that we must specifically 
assess if there is an extraordinarily relevant public 
interest for this exception indeed be it; otherwise, 
it will quickly become the standard. Thus, we can-
not configure health data as of public interest or 
public health by nature, or intrinsically, as it is es-
sential to articulate the values  in presence accord-
ing to proportionality criteria. Moreover, the bur-
den of proof that proportionality does exist is on 
the side of the person/entity that wants to retain 
the patient’s health data.
A severe utilitarian perspective is exceptionally ad-
missible given that a unique motive or an extraor-
dinary reason exists, as is the case of the corona-
virus outbreak. Autonomy and informational self-
determination, and the right not to know, shall not 
prevail in this specific context. Exceptional utili-
tarian measures might be proportional if subjected 
to the burden of proof. However, data controllers 
should destroy current lists of infected persons as 
soon as compliance with public health interest is 
over. Accordingly, the ‘right to be forgotten’, on a 
deontological perspective, might make sense once 
the pandemic ends. Where circumstances are nor-
mal, the maintenance of the processing of person-
al data relating to COVID-19 should depend on 
a specific purpose and specific consent of the data 
subject. Otherwise, the sacrifice regarding privacy 
is not proportional. Even if we have anonymized 
data, controllers should not maintain databases 
without consent. Simple crosschecks of personal 
data could result in patient re-identification in 
such databases. Therefore, as regards the sharing 
of the research results, it does not seem acceptable 
to assume the consent of data subjects, according 
to the principle of purpose limitation —Article 5, 
point 1/b) of the GDPR(8)— because the pur-
pose is not the same for which its collection first 
occurred. Perhaps the ‘right to be forgotten’ could 
have an essential part in this setting, which is 
much more unlimited than the public health pur-
poses justifying the processing of health data. A 
fortiori, the constitution of biobanks with blood 
and other biological specimens of COVID-19 
positive patients should be subject to the same 
rules. Thus, authorities should review the GDPR 
in light of these arguments. The ruling within the 
European Union should establish data sharing 
with respect for ethical considerations, biobanks 
of infected patients should comply with informed 
consent and regulation should allow the right to 
delete personal data provided the circumstance 
satisfies special requirements, such as the lack of 
concrete public health reasons. 
When we discuss public health, the public inter-
est is within the debate. Given that several pub-
lic health difficulties comprise a choice between 
health protection and individual liberties, a cost-
benefit analysis is then necessary. Proportionality 
is, thus, the critical factor. For that reason, as never 
before, policymakers, public health professionals 
and academics require humility, so that public 
health does not become a cold and calculating sci-
ence that visions human beings as mere statistics. 
It is not acceptable from an ethical point of view 
that we regard human beings only as a means, 
rather than an end in themselves, with intrinsic 
value(27,33). As Lee, Sim, Mackie(37) point out, 
the public health field of study should provide a 
basis for the evidence and a more significant sum 
of human knowledge. Nevertheless, we should be 
aware that these studies are brief observations of 
reality, which may reflect a partial view of human 
understanding. Even if unconsciously, it may be 
easy to forget the broader context in which public 
health work takes place, and many ethical dilem-
mas involving the practice of public health may 
often escape(37). Accordingly, since fundamental 
rights are not absolute, we need to reassess them 
in the light of the noble public health argument. 
However, then again the law should put a bound-
ary to the general movement regarding personal 
data availability in two dimensions: there must be 
a concrete causal link between the accessibility of 
data and the public health imperative and the time 
of storage. Consequently, the ‘right to be forgot-
ten’ may make sense in the future for some data, 
as they allow value judgments and might cause so-
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cial vulnerability(3). The social stigma argument 
draws attention to autonomy, privacy, and the 
need to protect personal health data, particularly 
regarding the ‘right to be forgotten’ in this setting. 
Social stigma might cause, besides others, severe 
medical injustices. Accordingly, the GDPR should 
regulate this issue adequately, particularly regard-
ing the ‘right to be forgotten’.
Conclusion
This article combines several challenging prob-
lems. The question of how basic philosophical 
concepts such as deontology and utilitarianism 
might help thinking about current data collection 
practices in response to the COVID-19 pandem-
ic. The risks that may result from the use of digital 
technologies concerning health data. The question 
of how existing legal frameworks —GDPR— 
govern data collection and usage practices in a 
public health emergency. Problems related to the 
proportionality assessment. Each of these ques-
tions would deserve an in-depth analysis; however, 
this article merely aimed to highlight problematic 
intertwined issues in order to discuss if the RTBF 
should or should not apply when it comes to emer-
gency exceptions in the data protection context, 
and based on what ethical considerations. As so, 
combined arguments framed on consequentialist 
and non-consequentialist ethical theories and hu-
man rights led us to argue that there seems to be 
no basis for the exercise of the ‘right to be forgot-
ten’ regarding health data when there are impera-
tive public health motives because proportionality 
is the critical factor concerning competing human 
rights. Nevertheless, in this case, the burden of 
proof is on the side of the health care authorities 
to show that there are compelling reasons, and 
therefore a moral duty, to preserve (and eventually 
share) patient’s health data. Indeed, when there are 
concrete and weighty public health purposes - as 
in the current case of coronavirus pandemic - we 
argue that policymakers, academics, and public 
health professionals should be careful that public 
health science does not become authoritarian, dis-
criminatory or uncooperative about fundamental 
rights. A severe utilitarian perspective, especially 
regarding those in society exposed to marginaliza-
tion because of social stigma, will increase even 
further their vulnerability. 
In times of a pandemic, although excessive privacy 
and data protection may seem irrational and dis-
proportionate, for those who suffer invasions of 
privacy, which is a condition of autonomy, identi-
ty and freedom, reality may be very different from 
the partial perceptions of exceptional times. 
Privacy, like other fundamental rights, is not an 
absolute value. Nevertheless, it must remain un-
questionable since it is a corollary of human dig-
nity. Thus, we feel that bioethics, technology, and 
the law have a duty to work together on this path.
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